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Abstract
We study the relationship between gerontocracy and aggregate economic perfomance in a simple
model where growth is driven by human capital accumulation and productive government spending. We
show that gerontocratic e´lites display the tendency to underinvest in public education and productive
government services and thereby may be harmful growth. In absence of intergenerational altruism,
the damage caused by gerontocracy is mainly due to the lack in long-term delayed-return investment
originated by the shorter life horizon of the ruling class with respect to the rest of the population.
An empirical analysis is carried out on a rich data set that allows to test theoretical results across
different countries and different sectors. The econometric results confirm our main hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the connection between the aggregate economic performance and the age
of the political e´lite of a society. In a very simple framework, we show that an older ruling class,
whose interest may be less devoted to long-term delayed-return investment, may weaken the human
capital accumulation process because of inadequate public education policies and hinder private
sector productivity growth because of poor expenditure in productive services. In this sense, we
argue that gerontocracy is harmful for growth. To estimate the impact of this phenomenon on
the economic performance, we use a wide set of information on the Parliamentarians of a group of
European countries along with a rich industry-level data set. Our main goal is to exploit differences
in the politicians’ age to estimate the effect that the gerontocracy exerts on the allocation of public
spending and thus on productivity growth.
Recent years have seen a surge of academic research and policy attention about the causes under-
lying differences in growth performance across OECD countries. Actually, per capita growth rates
have ceased to converge. While productivity has accelerated in some of the most emerging economies
and most notably in the United States, it has substantially slowed down especially in continental Eu-
rope and Japan (OECD [26]). Focusing on Europe, it is easily observed that since the mid-1990s, the
economic performance has experimented a significant contraction compared to earlier periods. The
economic literature developed so far has provided various explanations for such a sclerosis. The most
commonly cited causes of that sluggish growth concern the atavistic rigidity of the European model,
the burden of taxation, the people welfare dependency and the evidence that Europe has used some of
the increased productivity, pursued in the past, to increase leisure rather than income. Particularly,
a wide consensus has been reached among scholars regarding the “European model”, which, despite
its successes during the post-war era, is proving to be inadequate now that economic development
is increasingly based on innovation and national companies can no longer be protected from foreign
competition (Blanchard [8], Gordon [16]). Moreover, several studies point out that the adoption of
key general purpose technologies associated with the Information and Communication Technologies
(hereafter ICT) revolution has been hindered or impeded in Europe by an excessively regulated labor
market and an insufficient level of competition (van Ark et al.[29]). Despite this productivity crisis
is a common feature of a number of European economies, remarkable differences emerge from cross
country comparisons. For example, OECD [26] reported that, compared with the previous decade,
hourly labor productivity picked up in a group of economies, including Norway, Portugal, Germany,
Finland and Sweden.
Most recently, new studies are prospecting the idea that a large share of the heterogeneity experi-
enced across Europe could be attributed to the economic and political e´lites’ capacity of managing a
country (Caselli and Morelli [12], Mattozzi and Merlo [23]). Along these lines of thinking, the e´lites’
responsibilities, with respect to the institutional, social and technological delays accumulated in the
recent past, have become as an issue in the European economic picture.
It is worth noticing that the e´lites’ responsibility does not exclusively derive from their simple
tendency to maintain the status quo. It is also due to their inability to seize the opportunity given by
new technologies and to implement the best choice for the economy as a whole, a direct consequence
of the obsolescence of their own human capital.
We think that it is reasonable to assume that this obsolescence is crucially related to the power
e´lites’ age. Indeed, as pointed out by Messner and Polborn [24], many political or economic reforms
resemble investment projects in their return streams: initially, there is a cost to be borne, but
eventually there will be benefits. In this frame, young people will be able to enjoy the benefits longer
and hence will be more inclined to favor reforms than older people. Therefore, among individuals of
different ages, the oldest ones will not be in favor of the change because they mainly suffer the costs
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without being able to reap much of the benefits.
Figure 1: European demographic trend
Source: EUROSTAT
Notice that, here, we define a gerontocratic society as a place where the decision-making process
and the political environment are dominated by the oldest individuals, with negative consequences
in periods of rapid change and instability, when innovation and flexibility are at a premium.1
A related question is whether the progressive aging of European population may has led to the
increase of gerontocracy during the last three decades. Figure 1 shows the pattern followed by
the European demography along the period 1990-2003. This picture reflects the increase of life
expectancy. Figure 2 simply plots change in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2007 against the old
dependency ratio over the same period. What we prove in the following is that the negative impact of
aging is much stronger when we focus only on the e´lites’ and that is mainly due to all those country
specific characteristics (i.e. income distribution, electoral rules, social norms) that let power, wealth
and prestige flow upwards within an age pyramid in favor of elder power e´lites.2
Existing literature on labor economics provides further support in favor of our idea. Indeed,
several studies show that if we consider the average age of workers, without taking into account their
role in the firms, a negative link between seniority and productivity exists and this link is much more
dramatic in the ICT sector (See Daveri and Maliranta [14]). Indeed, workforce aging is known to
entail skill deterioration and lessened ability to adapt and learn new things. One possible explanation
relies on the cognitive abilities’ tendency to deteriorate with age. Although this decline is not uniform
across abilities, after a certain age threshold, further advancements in age are seemingly associated
1The Italian picture is emblematic of much that gerontocracy matters. Data recently published on the major Italian
newspapers cast no doubt about the fact that gerontocracy is an issue, in politics (Italian Prime minister is 65 year old and
the head of the opposition is 70), in the research field (in Italy there exist just 9 under 35 years old college professor and 3
over 10 are over 65 years old), in the banking system (many chairman are much over 65), and in the firms sector where the
family based production system lead to a patriarchal behavior. Hence, despite in Italy the retirement age is (nominally)
fixed at the age of 65, in politics that it seems the age correnspondent to the acme.
2We choose as leading indicator the proportion of population aged 14-64 years and the proportion of population aged
65 and over to population in the interval 15 to 64 provided by Eurostat, but similar pictures can easily be obtained using
other statistics.
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Figure 2: Old dependency ratio and GDP growth in Europe
Notes: Old dependency ratio is from EUROSTAT; growth rate of real GDP chain per capita GDP growth rate is from Penn world
Tables. Values are averaged by country from 1990 to 2007. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of
-0.0003 (standard error=0.0006), N=35, and R2=0.0124.
with lower productivity at work. Beyond that threshold, further increases of experience add little or
nothing to the working ability of a given worker. There are no reasons to believe that power e´lites
are excluded from this process.
Our paper is somehow related to the literature on interest group politics, where existing powerful
interest groups may impede the introduction of new technologies in order to protect their economic
rents (Fernandez and Rodrik [15], Alesina and Rodrik [2], Acemoglu and Robinson [1]). In these
contributions political e´lites block technological and institutional development because of a political
replacement effect. Innovations often erode e´lites’ incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood
that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political e´lites are unwilling to initiate change and
may even block economic development.3
Our paper is also related to the broad literature that studies the links between different political
variables and economic growth (Hashimzade and Davis [18], Hopenhayn and Muniagurria [19], Krusell
and Rios-Rull [21], Krusell et al. [22]). In particular, Hashimzade and Davis [18] provide an interesting
example on how political uncertainty might impede economic growth. The main conclusion of their
thoretical work is that an increase in a political instability produces growth-reducing policies because
leads governments to invest less in activities that support human capital accumulation. Along the
same line of reasoning, through a simple model very close to the one developed by those authors,
we argue that gerontocracy, involving an elder ruling class with a shorter life horizon with respect
to the average, determines lower investments in human capital and in productive public services and
thereby depresses economic development.4
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the baseline mode and discusses the links
3We plan to show in a future article that gerontocracy matters, not only in the political ruling class but even in the
entrepreneurial ruling class.
4This paper is not an attempt to explain what determines a gerontocratic ruling class (i.e. gerontocracy is not an
endogenous variable). The analysis of this phenomenon is on our research agenda. Here we consider gerontocracy (and in
the empirical part of the paper all the set of gerontocratic related variables) as exogenous and study the effect of this on
growth.
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among gerontocracy, public investments and economic growth. Our main conclusion is that geron-
tocracy is an important source of innovation-retarding policies and therefore depresses economic
development. Therefore it can be seen as plausible explanations of the growth pattern differentials
across countries. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis. Mostly we focus on how the performances
recorded by a group of European countries, whose political structures are often characterized by
leaders who are significantly older than most of the adult population, can be explained once this pe-
culiarity is recognized. Econometric results are consistent with theoretical predictions of the model.5
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
2.1 Set up
The model extends the framework proposed by Hashimzade and Davis [18] by taking into account
the role of public productive service, along with the public investment in education, as engine of the
human capital accumulation.
Demography . In a discrete-time t ∈ {0, 1, . . .∞} economy, a continuum of measure 1 of con-
sumers/workers produces a single homogenous good. At every moment, the same number of people
are born and die, so the population is constant and normalized to one. Each agent has an uncertain
lifetime and faces a probability υ of dying at any date. Following Boucekkine, de la Croix and Li-
candro [9], we model mortality such that the measure of each generation declines deterministically
through time. The unconditional probability for an agent of reaching age a ∈ [0, a] is defined as:6
υ(a) =
e−%a − κ
1− κ with κ > 0, % < 0, or κ ∈ (0, 1), % > 0 (1)
where the maximum age a that an agent can reach is given by:
a =
−log(κ)
%
(2)
No dynastic concerns are taken into account and people care only about their own utility. Similar
to Glomm and Ravikumar [17], in each period agents allocate their time between education (e) and
production (1− e).
Technology . Production function requires the use of human capital and government purchases
and takes the form:
Yt = AG
η
t [(1− e)Ht]1−η (3)
where A > 0 is the constant social marginal return of human capital, (1− e)Ht is the stock of human
capital at time t (i.e. efficiency of labor hour), Gt is the productive government spending (e.g. the
provision of productive services, the roll-out and adoption of broadband, antitrust legislation, etc)
available at the beginning of period t and 0 < η < 1.7
Human capital accumulation is determined according to the following production function:
Ht+1 = Ht + φ(Ht, Et) (4)
5In our specific case the countries involved in the quantitative analysis will be Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Germany
and UK.
6Typically, individual mortality does not depend only on the individuals age and hinges also on the own consumption
of health care and on the level of aggregate activity within a health care system. Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro [9]
exstensively discuss the survival law defined by equation (1).
7The public factor in equation (3) is a common external input. That is G is a pure public good.
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Figure 3: Survival law
where no depreciation is assumed, Et is the public investment in education and φ is the learning
technology described by the following homothetic function:
φ(Ht, Et) = eζH
α
t E
1−α
t (5)
with ζ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. Output is taxed at fixed rate τ . This implies that the following condition,
representing the government budget constraint, must hold:
τYt = Gt + Et +R
g = σgtτYt + σetτYt + (1− σgt − σet)τYt with (σgt + σet) ≤ 1 ∀t (6)
Net output is consumed by the consumers/workers, Cpt = (1− τ)Yt.
Political environment . At each time t the government in charge chooses σgt and σet to finance
productive government spending and public education respectively while the rest is consumed by the
government without any benefit for the community. Roughly speaking, this private benefit enjoyed by
the e´lites can be viewed as direct appropriation of tax revenues. For that reason we call it government
rent and we indicate it with Rgt . We assume that all the politicians in the office belong to the same
generation. This simplification allows to consider each Government as a single individual of age
a ∈ [0, a]. We consider an environment where two governments randomly alternate in office. To
keep matter simple, we follow Hashimzade and Davis [18] in assuming that the two governments are
identical and face the same exogenous probability pi of being voted out and replaced. At time zero,
political e´lites know their status 0 ∈ {l, w}.  = l means that the incumbent government has lost the
election. We assign at this event a positive probability pi. At the opposite, with probability (1− pi),
 = w and the incumbent government remains in charge. In the former case ( = l) goverment receives
a retirement rent Rr, in the latter ( = w) it allocates tax revenues between productive government
spending, public education and its own (unproductive) rent.
Political e´lites’ maximize the following instantaneous return function:
E0
∞X
t=0
(βυ(a))t [θU(Rgt ) + (1− θ)U(Cpt )] (7)
where U is the strictly concave twice differentiable istantaneous return function, Rgt = (1 − σgt −
σet)τYt is the government rent, C
p
t is the private consumption and β is the time discount factor.
In equation (7) θ and (1 − θ) are respectively the weight of government rent and the weight of the
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private consumption (i.e. θ provides a measure of politicians’ “selfishness”). while E0 denotes the
expectation conditional on information available at date t = 0.8
In a such environment the controls σg and σe at date t depend only on the current state H, so
that σgt = σg(Ht) and σet = σe(Ht).
The policy vector is denoted by Ψ = {σg1, σe1, σg2, σe2, . . . } and in the present economy we let
it consist of the amount of tax revenues the government invest to finance productive public services
and public education plans, σg and σe respectively.
In light of that it is important to point out that any given policy generates a stochastic law of
motion for the state:
Ht+1 = Ξ (Ht, σgt, σet, )
which will be stationary if σg and σe are stationary.
Following the standard notation used in literature, let now denote the variable at time t and t+ 1
as those without and with primes. The functional equation associated to the maximization problem
faced by a government in charge at the beginning of period t is
V (H, ) = max
{σe,σg}∞t=0
»
θU(Rg) + (1− θ)U(Cp)
–
+ βυ > (a)E
»
V (H
′
, 
′
)
–ff
(8)
s.t
Y = Y = AGη [(1− e)H]1−η
H0 > 0
H
′
= Ξ (H,σg, σe, )
C = (1− τ)Y
Rg =
(
(1− σg − σe)τY if  = w
Rr if  = l
(9)
where at time zero, H0 is pre-determined, and R
g
0 and H1 are chosen and the uncertainty is due to the
risk of an electoral loss in the subsequent period. Notice that equation (8) holds for any t ∈ (0,∞).
The value function (8) is the present discount value of the incumbent ruling class evalueted along the
optimal program.
As previously mentioned, Rr indicates the retirement rent gained in case of electoral loss. Since we
are focusing on the burden that gerontocracy places on the economic performance, it seems reasonable
to assume that the role played by the retirement rent - whose benefits can actually be enjoyed over a
short period of time - in the political e´lites’ decision process is negligible. Therefore we assume that
Rr is a constant and lower than (1− σg − σe)τY .
The following assumptions are maintained for the remainder of this section.
Assumption 1. Life expectancy declines through time according to (1).
Assumption 2. H ∈ H ⊂ R, (σg + σe) ∈ (0, 1) and E,G ∈ A ⊂ R.
Assumption 3. U : X → R is a strictly increasing, twice continously differentiable and concave
utility function, with U ′(0) =∞ and U ′(∞) = 0.
Assumption 4. Retirement rent Rr is assumed be constant, Rr = R < (1− σe − σg)τY .
In this model we choose to focus on the optimizing behavior of the political e´lites. Therefore
we postpone to a further extension the modeling of a voting stage and the analysis of the role
that population’s age may exert on the political outcomes and then on the aggregate economic
performance. In other words, in order to be able to analyze our main question in a meaningful way, we
8Notice that the expectation E is with respect to  and is understood to be conditional on σet and σgt.
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need to find a link between the age structure of the political e´lites and the policies implemented. For
that reason we focus on a such simple environment. Moreover we added an aggregate technology that
ensures a perpetual growth driven by productive government services and investment in education.
The provision of both government services and public education is financed by a tax on income, whose
revenues are also used to finance the e´lites’ unproductive rent Rg. As it will be more clear in the
following paragraph, this assumption is crucial to highlight the trade-off faced by the policy maker and
the role of gerontocracy. Each rational government will choose the amount of tax revenues to invest in
innovation and education that will yield a rent Rg as large as possible, under the uncertainty of being
re-elected in the subsequent election. In this conceptualization, the term υ(a)pi can be interpreted as
complement to 1 of the turnover rate, among politicians belonging to different generations. According
to the empirical evidence, this turnover rate raises as the political e´lite gets older. As it appers clearly
from equation (8), the lower is υ(a)pi the higher is the relative weight of the current benefit with
respect to the future, making it optimal for politicians to raise their private unproductive rent and
lower the productive public investments.
2.2 Equilibrium and Results
Here we interested into analyzing the long-run effects of gerontocracy, therefore we focus on the sta-
tionary equilibrium which involves time-invariant decision rules in the infinite horizon. This concept
uses a recursive representation of the political e´lites’ problem.
Definition 1. Given the initial H0 and Ht ∈ Γ(Ht−1) ⊂ H, with Γ continuous and compact-valued, a
Balaced Growth Path (hereafter BGP) for the economy is a collection of sequences {H,Y,Cp, Rg, σg, σe,
G,E, e}∞t=0 such that:
i) H evolves according to (4);
ii) government budget is balanced, τYt = Gt + Et +R
g
t ;
iii) politicians solve problem (8-9).
Let now Vl denote the value of an electoral loss, which occurs with probability pi, and Vw the value
of being electeded, which occurs with probability (1− pi). Then we have the following proposition.
The optimal value function V for the political e´lites’ optimization problem (8-9) is a solution to
the Bellman equation:
V (H) = max
{σe,σg}∞t=0
»
θU(Rg(H)) + (1− θ)U(Cp(H))
–
+ βυ(a)
»
piVl(H
′
) + (1− pi)Vw(H
′
)
–ff
(10)
subject to (9).
With interior equilibrium, the first order conditions and the envelope condition for the political
e´lites’ problem are respectively:
[FOC]
∂V
∂σg
= 0⇒ ∂U
∂σg
+ βυ(a)
»
pi
∂Vl
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σg
+ (1− pi)∂Vw
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σg
–
= 0 (11)
[FOC]
∂V
∂σe
= 0⇒ ∂U
∂σg
+ βυ(a)
»
pi
∂Vl
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σe
+ (1− pi)∂Vw
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σe
–
= 0 (12)
[ENV ]
∂Vl
∂H
=
∂U(R)
∂H
;
∂Vw
∂H
∂
∂H
»
θU(Rg) + (1− θ)U(Cp)
–
(13)
Conditions (11-12-13), togheter with the trasversality condition:
lim
t→∞
(βυ(a))t
∂U(·)
∂H
Ht = 0 (14)
and the initial condition of the economy fully characterize the solution of the political e´lites’ problem.
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Finally, the assumption of identical governments implies that they choose the same optimal level
of σe and σg, which is constant along the BGP where all the per capita variables grow at the same
rate given by
γ = ζe
h
A1/(1−η)σeσ
η/(1−η)
g τ (1− e)
i1−α
(15)
Simple algebra provides the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Along the BGP, the growth rate of per capita variables is increasing in the amount
of tax revenues used to finance education and productive services:
∂γ
∂σe
˛˛˛˛
BGP
> 0 and
∂γ
∂σg
˛˛˛˛
BGP
> 0
Proof 1. See appendix A.1.
Recalling that along BGP, H
′
= H(1 + γ), proposition 1 also implies:
∂H
′
∂σe
= H
„
1− α
σe
«
γ (16)
∂H
′
∂σg
= H
„
1− α
1− η
η
σg
«
γ (17)
2.2.1 Comparative statics: the role of gerontocracy
In order to obtain explicit solutions for σe and σg and do some comparative statics, we assume now
that the politicians’ preferences are defined as follows.
Assumption 5. Power e´lites’ utility function is logarithmic, U(·) = ln(·) ∀t ∈ (0,∞).
Provided that υ depends on the politicians’ age according to (1), solving (11-13) with respect σg
and σe yields:
σ∗g = η
βv (1− pi) (1− α)
θ + βv (1− pi) (1− α) , (18)
σ∗e = (1− η) βv (1− pi) (1− α)
θ + βv (1− pi) (1− α) . (19)
Proposition 2. Along the BGP, both the optimal government spending in productive services σ∗g and
education σ∗e decline when the political e´lite gets older. Thus, the older is the political e´lite (i.e. the
higher is a) the lower is the equilibrium growth rate γ.
Proof 2. See appendix A.2.
In a simple framework, we showed that politicians’ age is negatively related to their intentions in
favor of adopting potential growth enhancing policies (see Bellettini et al. [7], Tabaka and Barr [27]).
Our main finding is that public investments do respond to changes in the ruling class age structure,
which affect the re-election probabilitiy, and therefore size of the unproductive rent enjoyed by the
e´lite. We conclude that the older is the political e´lite, the lower are the public resources devoted
to productive services and education. Needless to say that if the ruling class does not introduce
innovations and does not invest in education, human capital accumulation declines and the economic
growth slows considerably.
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Figure 4: Gerontocracy and governement spending
Optimal investment in productive services (left graph), Optimal investment in education (right graph)
3 Empirical investigation
In this section we describe the empirical strategy in the search for explanations of the nexus between
gerontocracy and growth. To verify whether gerontocracy implies a lack of investment in education
and limitations in productive expenditure in our data set, we employ several specifications using
industry-level data for the EU industries. Our model predicts that growth depends on country-specific
factors such as ruling class’ age, which in turn determines the amount productive government spending
and the human capital accumulation pattern. Departing from our simple theoretical results, we also
attempt to exploit the richness of our data in order to assess the impact that the productive services
provided by the goverment exert on the performance of each single sector, during the observation
period.9
3.1 Data and descriptive analysis
Two are main sources employed in our empirical analysis. The first source is the DataCube provided
by EURELITE network that collects information concerning the characteristics of national parliamen-
tarians in European countries. The data set DataCube encompasses roughly fifty variables related
to the social and political background of national legislators. Beyond some basic socio-demographic
variables like education there is also information on politicians’ linkage to politics, economy and
other spheres of society. Particular attention is given to the pre-parliamentary political experience
including positions in local politics, leading party functions, and membership in the cabinet. In our
econometric exercise, we basically focus on two main policians’ attributes:
- the legislators age when they get in office, which actually constitues our measure of gerontocracy
and
- the percentage of newcomers in each electoral round, which provides a measure of the political
turnover.
Moreover a wide set of variable are taken into account and used as control, such as those that indicate
the positions in the framework of hierarchically and functionally differentiated societies (e.g. social
status, occupation, education, and gender), those that are more specically and directly related to the
9To the extent that those determinants are independent across countries, each national sector can be correctly treated
as an independent data point of an economic experiment.
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range of positions offered by the political system (such as involvement in party ofces, elective positions
at local and regional levels, and government ofces), and those that refer to their parliamentary career,
such as their age at entry into parliament and the number of elections for which they had stood
successfully. The summary statistics of the main variable involved in the subsequent analysis are
reported in table 9. Particularly, it must pointed out that both variables log(gerontocracy) and
log(newcomers), which are calculated on the mean age of the politicians in the office and the mean
age of the newcomers, have been previously corrected for national life expectancy in order to obtain
a more accurate measure of the relative elderly of the poltical class (see figure 5 for a detailed picture
of the cross country differences in life expectancy and politicians’ age in the sample).
Table 1: Summay statistics, gerontocracy related variables
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
log(gerontocracy) log of the politicians’ mean age 5670 3.87 0.04 3.79 3.97
log(new comers) log of the newcomers’ mean age 5670 3.78 0.06 3.58 3.91
log(seniority) log of the # of years in the office 5670 3.48 0.49 2.15 4.6
log(education) log of the % of politicians with a university degree 5670 4.1142 0.27 3.43 4.49
background local/national political backbround 5040 3.82 0.73 1.80 4.51
inter interaction b/w log(seniority) and log(newcomers) 5670 21.96 2.35 18.25 24.88
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for data definitions and sources.
Table 2: Summay statistics, EUKLEMS variables
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
log(tfp) log of the tfp growth index 5664 4.581 0.191 3.381 7.567
log(ict) log of the ict index 5866 4.490 0.904 0.139 7.405
log(nict) log of the non-ict index 5852 4.557 0.250 2.172 5.751
log(gict) log of the public ict index 5839 4.527 0.793 2.575 6.659
log(gos) log of the gross operating surplus index 5430 0.190 0.144 -0.205 0.981
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for data definitions and sources.
Figure 5: Life expectancy at birth & Politicians’ mean age, our sample
Source: our calculations
The second source is the databes provided by EU KLEMS. This data set includes measures of
economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at
the industry level for all European Union member states from 1970 onwards. The richness of the
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information collected by EU KLEMS allows to check the effects of gerontocracy at sectorial level and
suggests to use as endogenous variable the TFP growth, which can also be computed sector by sector,
in order to capture as much hetherogeneity as possible rather than on a mere aggregate indicator,
such teh per capita GDP. Moreover EU KLEMS provides our main measure for the public productive
services, which is identified by the public ICT expenditure (the variable gict). In order to construct
this variable we focus on the ICT capital services of the non-market economy. Those indicators
are directly provided by EU KLEMS and includes the real estate sector, public administration and
education, health and social services. According to our theretical frame, a strong linkage between
public ICT and TFP growth should emerge from the data. Our hypothesis, is that the former could
positively affect the latter by increasing the private ICT. The data support this intuition (see figure
6 where we plot the (log of) public and private ICT patterns).
Figure 6: Private and public ICT
Source: our calculations
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In merging information from these two different sources, we obtain a sample that includes 7
countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Germany and UK) and 71 industries aggregated into 6
“macro”sectors (electrical machinery post and communication, manufacturing, finance and business
services, distribution services, personal and social services, non-market services plus other goods
producing industries), from 1983 to 2004.
Finally, since we are interested in examining the effects of gerontocracy on growth focusing also
on how much it affects the public expenditures on education, a further variable has been taken into
account: the total expenditure on education (the variable pee), computed both as a percentage of
the GDP and as as a percentage of the total public expenditure and provided by EUROSTAT.
Before performing our econometric exercise, we now turn to examine the degree of correlation
between gerontocracy and TFP growth. Several interesting results emerge from table 3, where the
(n,m) cell shows the average correlation between the TFP growth rate of industry n and the level of
gerontocracy attributed to country m through the variable log(gerontocracy). The general negative
impact exerted by gerontocracy is quite transparent when looking at the last row of the table, which
reports the column average and then indicates the domestic correlation of the TFP growth with
our measure of gerontocracy. Particulary, this detrimental effect seems to be stronger the higher is
the technological complexity of the industry, being larger in sector as “electrical machinery post and
communication”. Notice that the older are the politicians the stronger are these negative correlations.
Indeed, with the sole exception of France whose politicians are (on average) the most educated of
the panel, higher negative correlations have been experienced where the gerontocracy is stronger (i.e.
Italy, Germany and UK).
A different picture appears if we compute the degree of correlation between variable log(newcomers)
and the sectorial TFP growth. Remember that this variable is the (log of the) age of the newcom-
ers in each national Parliament. Results reported in table 4 suggest that the problem is not the
politicians’ age sic et simpliciter. In comparison with the previous table, correlations are much more
tenuous and frequently positive. A possible explanation could be that older newcomers, during their
working life (presumably in the private sector), have acquired skills and competences that (partially
or completly) compensate the human capital obsolescence due to ’aging (see figure 9 in appendix for
further details).
Table 3: Correlation of sectorial TFP growth and log(gerontocracy)
country DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
industry
1 -0.521 0.129 -0.179 -0.645 -0.444 -0.741 -0.635 -0.434
2 0.034 0.146 -0.101 -0.537 -0.606 -0.565 -0.503 -0.305
3 -0.109 0.007 0.197 0.108 0.146 0.473 0.427 0.178
4 -0.083 0.239 -0.040 -0.609 -0.617 -0.643 -0.637 -0.341
5 0.648 -0.035 0.065 0.515 0.348 0.295 0.479 0.331
6 -0.281 0.128 0.038 -0.491 -0.013 -0.022 -0.454 -0.157
avg -0.052 0.102 -0.003 -0.277 -0.198 -0.201 -0.220
Notes: 1 - electrical machinery post and communication, 2- manufacturing, 3- finance and business services, 4- distribution
services, 5-personal and social services, 6-non-market services + other goods producing industries.
13
Table 4: Correlation of sectorial TFP growth and log(newcomers)
country DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
industry
1 -0.230 -0.195 0.450 -0.825 -0.404 0.292 0.442 -0.067
2 0.061 -0.067 0.235 -0.586 -0.578 0.467 0.454 -0.002
3 -0.022 0.019 -0.305 0.597 0.169 -0.572 -0.470 -0.084
4 -0.051 -0.012 0.259 -0.552 -0.574 0.309 0.472 -0.021
5 0.369 -0.100 -0.261 0.681 0.543 -0.558 -0.284 0.056
6 -0.092 -0.027 -0.111 -0.622 0.055 0.170 0.342 -0.041
avg 0.006 -0.064 0.045 -0.218 -0.131 0.018 0.159
Notes: 1 - electrical machinery post and communication, 2- manufacturing, 3- finance and business services, 4- distribution
services, 5-personal and social services, 6-non-market services + other goods producing industries.
3.2 Identification and estimation
Figure 7: Gerontocracy and TFP growth
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for data definitions and sources. Values are averaged by country and by year from 1983 to 2004. The
regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of -0.61 (standard error=0.19), N=182, and R2=0.0568.
Our simple theoretical model indicates that gerontocracy is growth reducing because it produces
insufficient investments in education (i.e. low pee) and innovation (i.e. low gict). Therefore the
econometric analysis must quantify both the impact of gerontocracy on the extent of such investments
and their contribution to the TFP growth. Our baseline approach relies on SUR technique (Zellner
[30], Zellner and Huang [31] and Zellner [32]). Formally, we specify a system of two equations:
sectorial TFP and (log of) ICT defined as follows:
14
gijt = α1 + β1peeijt + β2log(ict)ijt + β3Sijt + β4Xijt + ηijt (20)
log(ict)ijt = α2 + β5peeijt + β6log(gict)ijt + β7log(ict)ijt + β8log(gerontocracy)ijt−1
+β9log(newcomers)ijt−1 + β10log(seniority)ijt−1 (21)
+β11interijt−1 + β12log(education)ijt−1 + β13Sijt + β14Xijt + εijt
log(gict)ijt = α3 + β15peeijt + β16log(ict)ijt + β17log(gerontocracy)ijt−1
+β18log(newcomers)ijt−1 + β19log(seniority)ijt−1
+β20interijt−1 + β21log(education)ijt−1 + β22Sijt + β23Xijt + ξijt (22)
where i represents each (macro)sector, j represents each country t represents each time period (with
t = 1, 2, . . . T ).
In equations (20-22) gijt is the TFP growth rate while log(gict)ijt is the logarithm of the contri-
bution of public ICT capital service to growth (at time t in sector i in country j). Sijt is a vector
of sector-specific variables and Xijt is a vectors of other controls such as market openness, aggregate
public expenditure, country dummies. In the above specification gerontocracy affects TFP growth
because it explains both the private and public ICT (equations 21 and 22). That is the total effect
on TFP growth is given by
β2 (β8 + β6β17)
where the first term is the direct effect and the second one is the indirect effect trough the public
ICT investment.
Estimation results of the system equation (20) by are presented in Tables 5-6 with respect to the all
sample (estimates industry by industry are reportend in appendix A.4). Four different specifications
are presented to consider different TFP estimates provided by EU KLEMS (in models I and II the
TFP is value added based while in models III and IV it is gross output based) and different measure
of public expenditure on education, which have been considered either as in terms of GDP (peegdp in
models I and III) or as a share of the total public expenditure (peepe in models II and VI).
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Table 5: Gerontocracy & TFP, all sectors #1
Model I Model II
g log(ict) log(gict) ggo log(ict) log(gict)
log(hhs)t 0.0146** -0.0151 -0.00160 -0.0150
(0.00608) (0.0103) (0.00446) (0.0103)
log(hms)t 0.110*** 0.00449 0.0343*** 0.00705
(0.0181) (0.0311) (0.0133) (0.0311)
log(hls)t -0.0153* 0.0114 -0.0130** 0.0108
(0.00854) (0.0147) (0.00627) (0.0147)
log(gerontocracy)t−1 -5.065*** -5.634*** -5.070*** -5.655***
(0.585) (0.190) (0.584) (0.189)
log(newcomers)t−1 0.342 12.55*** 0.913 12.31***
(1.559) (0.529) (1.556) (0.527)
log(seniority)t−1 -0.649 6.276*** -0.342 6.166***
(1.158) (0.411) (1.156) (0.409)
log(gict)t 0.353*** 0.353***
(0.0480) (0.0479)
peegdpt 0.0810*** 0.179*** 0.0788*** 0.180***
(0.0179) (0.00574) (0.0178) (0.00572)
log(nict)t 0.220*** 0.211***
(0.0293) (0.0293)
log(ict)t 0.0260*** 0.00934***
(0.00479) (0.00352)
Constant 4.281*** -173.1*** -264.0*** 4.514*** -176.5*** -262.5***
(0.100) (14.12) (2.207) (0.0737) (14.09) (2.200)
Observations 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,221
R-squared 0.101 0.866 0.976 0.030 0.866 0.976
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Models I and II present TFP (value added based) growth as
dependent variable while models III and IV present TFP (gross output based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have
public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed
as share of the total public expenditure.
As predicted by the theory the empirical analysis based on SUR estimation indicates that the
TFP growth pattern is highly affected by gerontocracy. The main results are summarized in table 7
corroborate our theoretical prediction. Our regressions indicate that the TFP growth is mainly due
to ICT capital services and that gerontocracy negatively affect ICT capital services both directly and
indirectly, through the discouraging effect that it has on public ICT. Moreover public expenditure on
education positively affect TFP growth through the public ICT channel (log(gict)). Our estimations
indicates that a decrease of log(gerontocracy) increases unambigously the TFP growth index, with
elasticities equal to -0.18 and -0.07, depending on the measure of TFP growth and education employed.
We notice also that the adoption of ICT (log(ict)) is accompanied by complementary investments
(log(nict)), presumably related to changes in the organizational structure and the skill composition
of the labor force. Finally our result show that the TFP growth increases with the share of skilled
workers (log(hhs)).
It is worth noticing that possible edogeneity problem can arise because of the nature of ICT
capital, which might be correlated with the error term. If this endogeneity occurs previous
estimation methods is likely to produce biased and inconsistent results. Therefore we adopt
a different approach based on instrumental-variables (IV) regressions to estimate the impact
of gerontogracy on TFP growth. The alternative identification strategy might be to use the
(log of) public ICT log(gict) which is strictly related to the set of gerontocracy varibles, since
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Table 6: Gerontocracy & TFP, all sectors #2
Model III Model IV
Variables g log(ict) log(gict) ggo log(ict) log(gict)
log(hhs)t 0.0150** -0.0157 -0.00189 -0.0158
(0.00613) (0.0104) (0.00451) (0.0104)
log(hms)t 0.109*** 0.00491 0.0324** 0.00752
(0.0182) (0.0311) (0.0134) (0.0311)
log(hls)t -0.0146* 0.00990 -0.0133** 0.00914
(0.00859) (0.0147) (0.00632) (0.0147)
log(gerontocracy)t−1 -5.031*** -4.741*** -5.040*** -4.757***
(0.553) (0.207) (0.552) (0.207)
log(newcomers)t−1 2.554 11.93*** 3.121* 11.74***
(1.604) (0.615) (1.600) (0.614)
log(seniority)t−1 2.343* 7.109*** 2.615** 7.027***
(1.266) (0.498) (1.263) (0.497)
log(gict)t 0.397*** 0.397***
(0.0437) (0.0436)
peepet 0.0349*** 0.0255*** 0.0346*** 0.0254***
(0.00505) (0.00199) (0.00504) (0.00199)
log(nict)t 0.224*** 0.213***
(0.0293) (0.0293)
log(ict)t 0.0265*** 0.00992***
(0.00481) (0.00354)
Constant 4.276*** -194.0*** -290.5*** 4.518*** -197.0*** -289.3***
(0.101) (14.64) (2.898) (0.0742) (14.61) (2.894)
Observations 3,192 3,192 3,192 3,192 3,192 3,192
R-squared 0.101 0.867 0.972 0.030 0.867 0.972
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Models I and II present TFP (value added based) growth as
dependent variable while models III and IV present TFP (gross output based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have
public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed
as share of the total public expenditure.
Table 7: The effect of Gerontocracy on TFP growth
All sectors
via private ICT via public ICT Total
Model I -0.132*** -0.052*** -0.184***
Model II -0.047*** -0.019*** -0.066***
Model III -0.134*** -0.050*** -0.184***
Model IV -0.050*** -0.019*** -0.069***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Models I and II present TFP (value added based) growth as
dependent variable while models III and IV present TFP (gross output based) growth as dependent
variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while
models II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public
expenditure.
it directly derives from e´lite’s choice, as an instrument for the (log of) private ICT log(ict).
gijt = α1 + β1log(ict)ijt + β3Sijt + β4Xijt + ηijt (23)
log(ict)ijt = α2 + β5peeijt + β6log(gict)ijt + β7log(ict)ijt + β8log(gerontocracy)ijt−1
+β9log(newcomers)ijt−1 + β10log(seniority)ijt−1 (24)
+β11interijt−1 + β12log(education)ijt−1 + β13Sijt + β14Xijt + εijt
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Figure 8: 1st stage relationship between private and public ICT
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for data definitions and sources. Values are averaged by national sectors from 1983 to 2004. The
regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of .331 (standard error=0.098), N=54, and R2=0.16. 1 - electrical
machinery post and communication, 2- manufacturing, 3- finance and business services, 4- distribution services, 5-personal and
social services, 6-non-market services + other goods producing industries.
where i represents each (macro)sector, j represents each country t represents each time pe-
riod (with t = 1, 2, . . . T ). This identification strategy will be valid as long as (log(gict)) is
uncorrelated with ηijt, that is if the (log of the) public expenditure on ICT has no effect on
TFP growth other than through its influence on the private sectors’ ICT pattern. Figure 8
illustrate the relationship between the log(gict) and log(ict). The slope of the regression line
shows that an higher public expenditure on ICT has substantially improved the private one.
IV estimates are presented in table 8 for all sectors while results sector by sector are provided
in appendix A.5. These estimates display the strong negative first-stage relationship between
(log of) gerontocracy and the (log of) private ICT capital services, which in turn benefits from
the level of the (log of) public ICT capital services. The corresponding 2SLS estimate of the
income of private ICT on TFP growth is about 0.43 This result is also high significant, with
a p-value of 0.
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Table 8: Gerontocracy & TFP, all sectors
2SLS estimator 2-Step GMM estimation
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
First stage regression for log(ict)t
log(hhs)t -0.0221 0.016
log(hms)t -0.0151 0.484
log(hls)t 0.0073 0.599
log(marketopenness)t 0.4089 0.000
Gost−1 -0.0250 0.494
log(nict)t 0.2831 0.000
log(gerontocracy)t−1 -4.1623 0.000
log(newcomers)t−1 0.7737 0.579
log(seniority)t−1 0.7910 0.394
log(gict)t 0.3969 0.000
peegdp 0.5045 0.001
Trend 0.0868 0.000
Second stage
log(ict)t 0.4292 0.000 0.0418 0.000
log(hhs)t 0.0129 0.010 0.0118 0.000
log(hms)t 0.0046 0.626 -0.0003 0.959
log(hls)t -0.0067 0.350 -0.0032 0.521
log(marketopenness)t 0.0649 0.011 0.0957 0.000
Gost−1 0.0584 0.007 0.0932 0.000
Number of obs 3743 3743
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we argue that when young people cease to be the engine of an economy, long-run
economic growth is endangered. Over the last three decades, a lot of European economies
have fallen into an old-age trap, a self-reinforcing mechanism whereby e´lites, generally the
most aged individuals, have used control of the political system to exclude new generations,
who are reasonably the most dynamic and innovative part of the population, from the access
to power.
We do not analize this machanism formally (i.e. we do not explain what are the determi-
nants of gerontocracy). Moreover we do not focus on some possible “good”consequencies that
gerontocracy may have on a society as a whole, for example in reducing the inequalities. The
aim of this paper is to explore the possible linkages between the age of the ruling class and
the long-run growth rates both theoretically and empirically.
Our study relies on a simple endogenous growth model where long-run growth rate is di-
rectly affected by public productive services and public investment on education. The empiri-
cal analysis corroborates these findings. Estimations indicates that a decrease of gerontocracy
increases unambigously the TFP growth index, with elasticities equal to -1.17 percent in the
2SLS model and -0.18 and -0.07 in the SUR models.
There are several modifications to our approach that are worth pursuing. In the theoret-
ical model for instance, we introduce several assumptions aimed at obtaining an analytical
friendly framework. The next step will be to test how robust these results are when these
simplifications are relaxed. Particularly, we plan to address in a subsequent work the formal
attempt to endogenize the gerontocracy. Moreover, from an empirical standpoint we delegate
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to a further paper the extension of our data set in order to include information about the
managers employed in the private sector.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Along the BGP:
Yt+1 − Yt
Yt
∣∣∣∣
BGP
≡ γ =
[
A (τσgA)
η
1−η (1− e) η1−η
]
(Ht+1 −Ht)− 1 (25)
Recalling that Et = σeτYt and Gt = σgτYt, we obtain:
γ = eζ
[
τσeA
1
1−η (τσg(1− e)η)
η
1−η
]1−α
Differrentiating γ w.r.t. σe and σg yields:
∂γ
∂σe
= eζ
(
σeτ A
1
1−η (τ σg (1− e)η)
η
1−η
)1−α (1− α)
σe
> 0 (26)
∂γ
∂σg
= eζ
(
σeτ A
1
1−η (τ σg (1− e)η)
η
1−η
)1−α (1− α) η
(1− η)σg > 0 (27)
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
σ∗g
da
=
dσ∗g
dv
dv
da
= η
β (1− pi) (1− α)
[θ + βv (1− pi) (1− α)]2
dv
da
< 0
σ∗e
da
=
dσ∗e
dv
dv
da
= (1− η) β (1− pi) (1− α)
[θ + βv (1− pi) (1− α)]2
dv
da
< 0
because of assumption (A.2) which implies that v′ (a) < 0.
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A.3 Data definitions and sources
Table 9: Data definitions and sources
Variables Source
Gerontocracy related variables
log(gerontocracy) = log of the politicians’ mean age EURELITE
log(newcomers) = log of the newcomers’ mean age EURELITE
log(seniority) = log of the # of years in the office EURELITE
log(education) = log of the % of politicians with a university degree EURELITE
background = local/national political backbround EURELITE
inter = interaction b/w log(seniority) and log(newcomers) EURELITE
roots = log of place of birth=place election EURELITE
gos = Gross operating surplus (in millions of local currency) EU KLEMS
Growth accounting variables
g = TFP (value added based) growth (1995=100) EU KLEMS
gGO = TFP (gross output based) growth (1995=100) EU KLEMS
log(ict) = log of ICT capital services (1995=100) EU KLEMS
log(nict) = log of non-ICT capital services (1995=100) EU KLEMS
log(gict) = log of non-market + other goods industries ICT capital services (1995=100) our calculation
on EU KLEMS
log(hhs) = log of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU KLEMS
log(hms) = log of hours worked by medium-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU KLEMS
log(hls) = log of hours worked by low-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU KLEMS
log(marketopenness)= log of exports plus Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP PWT 6.1
Education variables
peepe= public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure EUROSTAT
peegdp= public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP EUROSTAT
24
Figure 9: Politicians’ education
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for data definitions and sources. Values in the lower panel are averaged by country from 1983 to 2004.
The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of 1.7 (standard error=3.07), N=7, and R2=0.05.
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A.4 SUR estimates: sector by sector
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Table 10: Gerontocracy & TFP, Electrical machinery, post and communication#1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I II
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00938 0.00950 -0.00558 0.00961
(0.00759) (0.0119) (0.00550) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0455 0.0527** 0.0503
(0.0298) (0.0479) (0.0216) (0.0479)
l hls -0.0157 0.0269 -0.0121 0.0271
(0.0110) (0.0177) (0.00799) (0.0177)
l marketopeness 0.245*** -0.532*** 0.0556* 0.0831*** -0.548*** 0.0650**
(0.0356) (0.0764) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0763) (0.0286)
dum2 -0.0635*** -0.639 -0.762*** -0.0239 -0.653 -0.720***
(0.0214) (0.563) (0.211) (0.0156) (0.562) (0.210)
dum3 0.0173 -0.944** -0.689*** 0.0235 -0.927** -0.675***
(0.0225) (0.460) (0.172) (0.0163) (0.459) (0.171)
dum4 0.103*** -0.00556 1.174*** 0.0445*** 0.0183 1.166***
(0.0137) (0.129) (0.0426) (0.00998) (0.129) (0.0425)
dum5 0.0631** -0.301*** 0.578*** 0.0286 -0.260*** 0.562***
(0.0251) (0.0801) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0800) (0.0277)
dum6 -0.0706* -0.240*** -0.600*** -0.0448 -0.257*** -0.592***
(0.0424) (0.0910) (0.0229) (0.0308) (0.0909) (0.0228)
dum7 -0.189*** -0.244 -1.254*** -0.0904*** -0.277 -1.213***
(0.0320) (0.557) (0.207) (0.0233) (0.556) (0.207)
L.l gerontocracy -3.604*** -5.619*** -3.604*** -5.641***
(0.627) (0.209) (0.626) (0.208)
L.l newcomers -1.490 12.51*** -0.917 12.26***
(1.673) (0.581) (1.670) (0.579)
L.l seniority -1.729 6.246*** -1.421 6.131***
(1.242) (0.452) (1.239) (0.450)
L.inter 0.361 -1.807*** 0.272 -1.768***
(0.277) (0.0983) (0.277) (0.0980)
L.l education -0.440*** -0.707*** -0.466*** -0.699***
(0.148) (0.0541) (0.148) (0.0540)
L.l background -0.181 -0.745*** -0.180 -0.735***
(0.138) (0.0498) (0.138) (0.0496)
L.local 0.523*** -0.279*** 0.474*** -0.260***
(0.0727) (0.0268) (0.0725) (0.0267)
L.roots 0.123 1.133*** 0.151 1.127***
(0.126) (0.0417) (0.126) (0.0415)
gos 0.117*** 0.0527 0.109*** 0.0533
(0.0323) (0.0500) (0.0234) (0.0500)
l gict 0.352*** 0.352***
(0.0514) (0.0513)
pee gdp 0.0717*** 0.179*** 0.0696*** 0.180***
(0.0192) (0.00631) (0.0192) (0.00629)
l nict 0.342*** 0.328***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00658 0.0423*** 0.00368 -0.00499 0.0424*** 0.00367
(0.00673) (0.0114) (0.00428) (0.00490) (0.0114) (0.00428)
trend 0.0881*** 0.125*** 0.0891*** 0.124***
(0.00689) (0.000871) (0.00687) (0.000869)
l ict 0.0377*** 0.0151***
(0.00588) (0.00427)
Constant 4.123*** -155.3*** -263.7*** 4.435*** -158.8*** -262.2***
(0.155) (15.15) (2.430) (0.113) (15.11) (2.422)
Observations 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670
R-squared 0.133 0.866 0.976 0.043 0.866 0.976
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 11: Gerontocracy & TFP, Electrical machinery, post and communication#2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
III IV
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00973 0.00854 -0.00604 0.00856
(0.00765) (0.0119) (0.00556) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0461 0.0484** 0.0508
(0.0300) (0.0477) (0.0218) (0.0477)
l hls -0.0147 0.0236 -0.0128 0.0236
(0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00806) (0.0176)
l marketopeness 0.244*** -0.662*** -0.166*** 0.0816*** -0.676*** -0.159***
(0.0359) (0.0752) (0.0311) (0.0262) (0.0751) (0.0311)
dum2 -0.0632*** 1.626*** 1.554*** -0.0243 1.570*** 1.594***
(0.0215) (0.594) (0.243) (0.0157) (0.593) (0.243)
dum3 0.0167 1.108** 1.113*** 0.0226 1.093** 1.128***
(0.0226) (0.509) (0.209) (0.0165) (0.508) (0.209)
dum4 0.103*** 0.280** 1.584*** 0.0439*** 0.299** 1.580***
(0.0138) (0.135) (0.0464) (0.0100) (0.135) (0.0463)
dum5 0.0679** -0.160* 0.819*** 0.0330 -0.119 0.807***
(0.0302) (0.0860) (0.0317) (0.0220) (0.0859) (0.0317)
dum6 -0.0672 -0.150 -0.683*** -0.0465 -0.168* -0.678***
(0.0427) (0.0922) (0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0921) (0.0264)
dum7 -0.188*** 2.034*** 0.406 -0.0892*** 1.966*** 0.440*
(0.0322) (0.619) (0.256) (0.0235) (0.617) (0.255)
L.l gerontocracy -3.745*** -4.738*** -3.751*** -4.753***
(0.593) (0.228) (0.592) (0.227)
L.l newcomers 1.202 11.92*** 1.778 11.71***
(1.718) (0.677) (1.713) (0.676)
L.l seniority 1.554 7.098*** 1.836 7.005***
(1.355) (0.547) (1.352) (0.546)
L.inter -0.117 -1.765*** -0.205 -1.733***
(0.288) (0.115) (0.287) (0.115)
L.l education -0.289* -0.682*** -0.322** -0.675***
(0.149) (0.0607) (0.149) (0.0606)
L.l background -0.130 -0.629*** -0.129 -0.619***
(0.135) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0546)
L.local 0.308*** -0.645*** 0.259*** -0.631***
(0.0766) (0.0292) (0.0764) (0.0292)
L.roots 0.150 1.573*** 0.176 1.573***
(0.127) (0.0425) (0.126) (0.0425)
gos 0.118*** 0.0442 0.110*** 0.0448
(0.0325) (0.0501) (0.0237) (0.0501)
l gict 0.379*** 0.379***
(0.0468) (0.0467)
pee pe 0.0373*** 0.0255*** 0.0371*** 0.0252***
(0.00542) (0.00219) (0.00540) (0.00219)
l nict 0.351*** 0.337***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00588 0.0298*** -0.00417 -0.00480 0.0299*** -0.00410
(0.00656) (0.0109) (0.00451) (0.00478) (0.0109) (0.00451)
trend 0.0918*** 0.134*** 0.0927*** 0.134***
(0.00678) (0.00101) (0.00677) (0.00101)
l ict 0.0385*** 0.0159***
(0.00590) (0.00429)
Constant 4.114*** -181.7*** -290.3*** 4.450*** -184.9*** -289.1***
(0.156) (15.65) (3.187) (0.113) (15.62) (3.183)
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.133 0.868 0.972 0.043 0.868 0.972
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 12: Gerontocracy & TFP, Manufacturing (excluding electrical)#1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I II
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00938 0.00950 -0.00558 0.00961
(0.00759) (0.0119) (0.00550) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0455 0.0527** 0.0503
(0.0298) (0.0479) (0.0216) (0.0479)
l hls -0.0157 0.0269 -0.0121 0.0271
(0.0110) (0.0177) (0.00799) (0.0177)
l marketopeness 0.245*** -0.532*** 0.0556* 0.0831*** -0.548*** 0.0650**
(0.0356) (0.0764) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0763) (0.0286)
dum2 -0.0635*** -0.639 -0.762*** -0.0239 -0.653 -0.720***
(0.0214) (0.563) (0.211) (0.0156) (0.562) (0.210)
dum3 0.0173 -0.944** -0.689*** 0.0235 -0.927** -0.675***
(0.0225) (0.460) (0.172) (0.0163) (0.459) (0.171)
dum4 0.103*** -0.00556 1.174*** 0.0445*** 0.0183 1.166***
(0.0137) (0.129) (0.0426) (0.00998) (0.129) (0.0425)
dum5 0.0631** -0.301*** 0.578*** 0.0286 -0.260*** 0.562***
(0.0251) (0.0801) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0800) (0.0277)
dum6 -0.0706* -0.240*** -0.600*** -0.0448 -0.257*** -0.592***
(0.0424) (0.0910) (0.0229) (0.0308) (0.0909) (0.0228)
dum7 -0.189*** -0.244 -1.254*** -0.0904*** -0.277 -1.213***
(0.0320) (0.557) (0.207) (0.0233) (0.556) (0.207)
L.l gerontocracy -3.604*** -5.619*** -3.604*** -5.641***
(0.627) (0.209) (0.626) (0.208)
L.l newcomers -1.490 12.51*** -0.917 12.26***
(1.673) (0.581) (1.670) (0.579)
L.l seniority -1.729 6.246*** -1.421 6.131***
(1.242) (0.452) (1.239) (0.450)
L.inter 0.361 -1.807*** 0.272 -1.768***
(0.277) (0.0983) (0.277) (0.0980)
L.l education -0.440*** -0.707*** -0.466*** -0.699***
(0.148) (0.0541) (0.148) (0.0540)
L.l background -0.181 -0.745*** -0.180 -0.735***
(0.138) (0.0498) (0.138) (0.0496)
L.local 0.523*** -0.279*** 0.474*** -0.260***
(0.0727) (0.0268) (0.0725) (0.0267)
L.roots 0.123 1.133*** 0.151 1.127***
(0.126) (0.0417) (0.126) (0.0415)
gos 0.117*** 0.0527 0.109*** 0.0533
(0.0323) (0.0500) (0.0234) (0.0500)
l gict 0.352*** 0.352***
(0.0514) (0.0513)
pee gdp 0.0717*** 0.179*** 0.0696*** 0.180***
(0.0192) (0.00631) (0.0192) (0.00629)
l nict 0.342*** 0.328***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00658 0.0423*** 0.00368 -0.00499 0.0424*** 0.00367
(0.00673) (0.0114) (0.00428) (0.00490) (0.0114) (0.00428)
trend 0.0881*** 0.125*** 0.0891*** 0.124***
(0.00689) (0.000871) (0.00687) (0.000869)
l ict 0.0377*** 0.0151***
(0.00588) (0.00427)
Constant 4.123*** -155.3*** -263.7*** 4.435*** -158.8*** -262.2***
(0.155) (15.15) (2.430) (0.113) (15.11) (2.422)
Observations 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670
R-squared 0.133 0.866 0.976 0.043 0.866 0.976
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 13: Gerontocracy & TFP, Manufacturing (excluding electrical)#2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
III IV
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00973 0.00854 -0.00604 0.00856
(0.00765) (0.0119) (0.00556) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0461 0.0484** 0.0508
(0.0300) (0.0477) (0.0218) (0.0477)
l hls -0.0147 0.0236 -0.0128 0.0236
(0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00806) (0.0176)
l marketopeness 0.244*** -0.662*** -0.166*** 0.0816*** -0.676*** -0.159***
(0.0359) (0.0752) (0.0311) (0.0262) (0.0751) (0.0311)
dum2 -0.0632*** 1.626*** 1.554*** -0.0243 1.570*** 1.594***
(0.0215) (0.594) (0.243) (0.0157) (0.593) (0.243)
dum3 0.0167 1.108** 1.113*** 0.0226 1.093** 1.128***
(0.0226) (0.509) (0.209) (0.0165) (0.508) (0.209)
dum4 0.103*** 0.280** 1.584*** 0.0439*** 0.299** 1.580***
(0.0138) (0.135) (0.0464) (0.0100) (0.135) (0.0463)
dum5 0.0679** -0.160* 0.819*** 0.0330 -0.119 0.807***
(0.0302) (0.0860) (0.0317) (0.0220) (0.0859) (0.0317)
dum6 -0.0672 -0.150 -0.683*** -0.0465 -0.168* -0.678***
(0.0427) (0.0922) (0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0921) (0.0264)
dum7 -0.188*** 2.034*** 0.406 -0.0892*** 1.966*** 0.440*
(0.0322) (0.619) (0.256) (0.0235) (0.617) (0.255)
L.l gerontocracy -3.745*** -4.738*** -3.751*** -4.753***
(0.593) (0.228) (0.592) (0.227)
L.l newcomers 1.202 11.92*** 1.778 11.71***
(1.718) (0.677) (1.713) (0.676)
L.l seniority 1.554 7.098*** 1.836 7.005***
(1.355) (0.547) (1.352) (0.546)
L.inter -0.117 -1.765*** -0.205 -1.733***
(0.288) (0.115) (0.287) (0.115)
L.l education -0.289* -0.682*** -0.322** -0.675***
(0.149) (0.0607) (0.149) (0.0606)
L.l background -0.130 -0.629*** -0.129 -0.619***
(0.135) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0546)
L.local 0.308*** -0.645*** 0.259*** -0.631***
(0.0766) (0.0292) (0.0764) (0.0292)
L.roots 0.150 1.573*** 0.176 1.573***
(0.127) (0.0425) (0.126) (0.0425)
gos 0.118*** 0.0442 0.110*** 0.0448
(0.0325) (0.0501) (0.0237) (0.0501)
l gict 0.379*** 0.379***
(0.0468) (0.0467)
pee pe 0.0373*** 0.0255*** 0.0371*** 0.0252***
(0.00542) (0.00219) (0.00540) (0.00219)
l nict 0.351*** 0.337***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00588 0.0298*** -0.00417 -0.00480 0.0299*** -0.00410
(0.00656) (0.0109) (0.00451) (0.00478) (0.0109) (0.00451)
trend 0.0918*** 0.134*** 0.0927*** 0.134***
(0.00678) (0.00101) (0.00677) (0.00101)
l ict 0.0385*** 0.0159***
(0.00590) (0.00429)
Constant 4.114*** -181.7*** -290.3*** 4.450*** -184.9*** -289.1***
(0.156) (15.65) (3.187) (0.113) (15.62) (3.183)
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.133 0.868 0.972 0.043 0.868 0.972
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 14: Gerontocracy & TFP, Finance and business services#1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I II
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00938 0.00950 -0.00558 0.00961
(0.00759) (0.0119) (0.00550) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0455 0.0527** 0.0503
(0.0298) (0.0479) (0.0216) (0.0479)
l hls -0.0157 0.0269 -0.0121 0.0271
(0.0110) (0.0177) (0.00799) (0.0177)
l marketopeness 0.245*** -0.532*** 0.0556* 0.0831*** -0.548*** 0.0650**
(0.0356) (0.0764) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0763) (0.0286)
dum2 -0.0635*** -0.639 -0.762*** -0.0239 -0.653 -0.720***
(0.0214) (0.563) (0.211) (0.0156) (0.562) (0.210)
dum3 0.0173 -0.944** -0.689*** 0.0235 -0.927** -0.675***
(0.0225) (0.460) (0.172) (0.0163) (0.459) (0.171)
dum4 0.103*** -0.00556 1.174*** 0.0445*** 0.0183 1.166***
(0.0137) (0.129) (0.0426) (0.00998) (0.129) (0.0425)
dum5 0.0631** -0.301*** 0.578*** 0.0286 -0.260*** 0.562***
(0.0251) (0.0801) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0800) (0.0277)
dum6 -0.0706* -0.240*** -0.600*** -0.0448 -0.257*** -0.592***
(0.0424) (0.0910) (0.0229) (0.0308) (0.0909) (0.0228)
dum7 -0.189*** -0.244 -1.254*** -0.0904*** -0.277 -1.213***
(0.0320) (0.557) (0.207) (0.0233) (0.556) (0.207)
L.l gerontocracy -3.604*** -5.619*** -3.604*** -5.641***
(0.627) (0.209) (0.626) (0.208)
L.l newcomers -1.490 12.51*** -0.917 12.26***
(1.673) (0.581) (1.670) (0.579)
L.l seniority -1.729 6.246*** -1.421 6.131***
(1.242) (0.452) (1.239) (0.450)
L.inter 0.361 -1.807*** 0.272 -1.768***
(0.277) (0.0983) (0.277) (0.0980)
L.l education -0.440*** -0.707*** -0.466*** -0.699***
(0.148) (0.0541) (0.148) (0.0540)
L.l background -0.181 -0.745*** -0.180 -0.735***
(0.138) (0.0498) (0.138) (0.0496)
L.local 0.523*** -0.279*** 0.474*** -0.260***
(0.0727) (0.0268) (0.0725) (0.0267)
L.roots 0.123 1.133*** 0.151 1.127***
(0.126) (0.0417) (0.126) (0.0415)
gos 0.117*** 0.0527 0.109*** 0.0533
(0.0323) (0.0500) (0.0234) (0.0500)
l gict 0.352*** 0.352***
(0.0514) (0.0513)
pee gdp 0.0717*** 0.179*** 0.0696*** 0.180***
(0.0192) (0.00631) (0.0192) (0.00629)
l nict 0.342*** 0.328***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00658 0.0423*** 0.00368 -0.00499 0.0424*** 0.00367
(0.00673) (0.0114) (0.00428) (0.00490) (0.0114) (0.00428)
trend 0.0881*** 0.125*** 0.0891*** 0.124***
(0.00689) (0.000871) (0.00687) (0.000869)
l ict 0.0377*** 0.0151***
(0.00588) (0.00427)
Constant 4.123*** -155.3*** -263.7*** 4.435*** -158.8*** -262.2***
(0.155) (15.15) (2.430) (0.113) (15.11) (2.422)
Observations 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670
R-squared 0.133 0.866 0.976 0.043 0.866 0.976
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 15: Gerontocracy & TFP, Finance and business services#2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
III IV
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00973 0.00854 -0.00604 0.00856
(0.00765) (0.0119) (0.00556) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0461 0.0484** 0.0508
(0.0300) (0.0477) (0.0218) (0.0477)
l hls -0.0147 0.0236 -0.0128 0.0236
(0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00806) (0.0176)
l marketopeness 0.244*** -0.662*** -0.166*** 0.0816*** -0.676*** -0.159***
(0.0359) (0.0752) (0.0311) (0.0262) (0.0751) (0.0311)
dum2 -0.0632*** 1.626*** 1.554*** -0.0243 1.570*** 1.594***
(0.0215) (0.594) (0.243) (0.0157) (0.593) (0.243)
dum3 0.0167 1.108** 1.113*** 0.0226 1.093** 1.128***
(0.0226) (0.509) (0.209) (0.0165) (0.508) (0.209)
dum4 0.103*** 0.280** 1.584*** 0.0439*** 0.299** 1.580***
(0.0138) (0.135) (0.0464) (0.0100) (0.135) (0.0463)
dum5 0.0679** -0.160* 0.819*** 0.0330 -0.119 0.807***
(0.0302) (0.0860) (0.0317) (0.0220) (0.0859) (0.0317)
dum6 -0.0672 -0.150 -0.683*** -0.0465 -0.168* -0.678***
(0.0427) (0.0922) (0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0921) (0.0264)
dum7 -0.188*** 2.034*** 0.406 -0.0892*** 1.966*** 0.440*
(0.0322) (0.619) (0.256) (0.0235) (0.617) (0.255)
L.l gerontocracy -3.745*** -4.738*** -3.751*** -4.753***
(0.593) (0.228) (0.592) (0.227)
L.l newcomers 1.202 11.92*** 1.778 11.71***
(1.718) (0.677) (1.713) (0.676)
L.l seniority 1.554 7.098*** 1.836 7.005***
(1.355) (0.547) (1.352) (0.546)
L.inter -0.117 -1.765*** -0.205 -1.733***
(0.288) (0.115) (0.287) (0.115)
L.l education -0.289* -0.682*** -0.322** -0.675***
(0.149) (0.0607) (0.149) (0.0606)
L.l background -0.130 -0.629*** -0.129 -0.619***
(0.135) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0546)
L.local 0.308*** -0.645*** 0.259*** -0.631***
(0.0766) (0.0292) (0.0764) (0.0292)
L.roots 0.150 1.573*** 0.176 1.573***
(0.127) (0.0425) (0.126) (0.0425)
gos 0.118*** 0.0442 0.110*** 0.0448
(0.0325) (0.0501) (0.0237) (0.0501)
l gict 0.379*** 0.379***
(0.0468) (0.0467)
pee pe 0.0373*** 0.0255*** 0.0371*** 0.0252***
(0.00542) (0.00219) (0.00540) (0.00219)
l nict 0.351*** 0.337***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00588 0.0298*** -0.00417 -0.00480 0.0299*** -0.00410
(0.00656) (0.0109) (0.00451) (0.00478) (0.0109) (0.00451)
trend 0.0918*** 0.134*** 0.0927*** 0.134***
(0.00678) (0.00101) (0.00677) (0.00101)
l ict 0.0385*** 0.0159***
(0.00590) (0.00429)
Constant 4.114*** -181.7*** -290.3*** 4.450*** -184.9*** -289.1***
(0.156) (15.65) (3.187) (0.113) (15.62) (3.183)
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.133 0.868 0.972 0.043 0.868 0.972
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 16: Gerontocracy & TFP, Personal and social services#1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I II
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00938 0.00950 -0.00558 0.00961
(0.00759) (0.0119) (0.00550) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0455 0.0527** 0.0503
(0.0298) (0.0479) (0.0216) (0.0479)
l hls -0.0157 0.0269 -0.0121 0.0271
(0.0110) (0.0177) (0.00799) (0.0177)
l marketopeness 0.245*** -0.532*** 0.0556* 0.0831*** -0.548*** 0.0650**
(0.0356) (0.0764) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0763) (0.0286)
dum2 -0.0635*** -0.639 -0.762*** -0.0239 -0.653 -0.720***
(0.0214) (0.563) (0.211) (0.0156) (0.562) (0.210)
dum3 0.0173 -0.944** -0.689*** 0.0235 -0.927** -0.675***
(0.0225) (0.460) (0.172) (0.0163) (0.459) (0.171)
dum4 0.103*** -0.00556 1.174*** 0.0445*** 0.0183 1.166***
(0.0137) (0.129) (0.0426) (0.00998) (0.129) (0.0425)
dum5 0.0631** -0.301*** 0.578*** 0.0286 -0.260*** 0.562***
(0.0251) (0.0801) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0800) (0.0277)
dum6 -0.0706* -0.240*** -0.600*** -0.0448 -0.257*** -0.592***
(0.0424) (0.0910) (0.0229) (0.0308) (0.0909) (0.0228)
dum7 -0.189*** -0.244 -1.254*** -0.0904*** -0.277 -1.213***
(0.0320) (0.557) (0.207) (0.0233) (0.556) (0.207)
L.l gerontocracy -3.604*** -5.619*** -3.604*** -5.641***
(0.627) (0.209) (0.626) (0.208)
L.l newcomers -1.490 12.51*** -0.917 12.26***
(1.673) (0.581) (1.670) (0.579)
L.l seniority -1.729 6.246*** -1.421 6.131***
(1.242) (0.452) (1.239) (0.450)
L.inter 0.361 -1.807*** 0.272 -1.768***
(0.277) (0.0983) (0.277) (0.0980)
L.l education -0.440*** -0.707*** -0.466*** -0.699***
(0.148) (0.0541) (0.148) (0.0540)
L.l background -0.181 -0.745*** -0.180 -0.735***
(0.138) (0.0498) (0.138) (0.0496)
L.local 0.523*** -0.279*** 0.474*** -0.260***
(0.0727) (0.0268) (0.0725) (0.0267)
L.roots 0.123 1.133*** 0.151 1.127***
(0.126) (0.0417) (0.126) (0.0415)
gos 0.117*** 0.0527 0.109*** 0.0533
(0.0323) (0.0500) (0.0234) (0.0500)
l gict 0.352*** 0.352***
(0.0514) (0.0513)
pee gdp 0.0717*** 0.179*** 0.0696*** 0.180***
(0.0192) (0.00631) (0.0192) (0.00629)
l nict 0.342*** 0.328***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00658 0.0423*** 0.00368 -0.00499 0.0424*** 0.00367
(0.00673) (0.0114) (0.00428) (0.00490) (0.0114) (0.00428)
trend 0.0881*** 0.125*** 0.0891*** 0.124***
(0.00689) (0.000871) (0.00687) (0.000869)
l ict 0.0377*** 0.0151***
(0.00588) (0.00427)
Constant 4.123*** -155.3*** -263.7*** 4.435*** -158.8*** -262.2***
(0.155) (15.15) (2.430) (0.113) (15.11) (2.422)
Observations 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670
R-squared 0.133 0.866 0.976 0.043 0.866 0.976
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 17: Gerontocracy & TFP, Personal and social services#2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
III IV
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00973 0.00854 -0.00604 0.00856
(0.00765) (0.0119) (0.00556) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0461 0.0484** 0.0508
(0.0300) (0.0477) (0.0218) (0.0477)
l hls -0.0147 0.0236 -0.0128 0.0236
(0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00806) (0.0176)
l marketopeness 0.244*** -0.662*** -0.166*** 0.0816*** -0.676*** -0.159***
(0.0359) (0.0752) (0.0311) (0.0262) (0.0751) (0.0311)
dum2 -0.0632*** 1.626*** 1.554*** -0.0243 1.570*** 1.594***
(0.0215) (0.594) (0.243) (0.0157) (0.593) (0.243)
dum3 0.0167 1.108** 1.113*** 0.0226 1.093** 1.128***
(0.0226) (0.509) (0.209) (0.0165) (0.508) (0.209)
dum4 0.103*** 0.280** 1.584*** 0.0439*** 0.299** 1.580***
(0.0138) (0.135) (0.0464) (0.0100) (0.135) (0.0463)
dum5 0.0679** -0.160* 0.819*** 0.0330 -0.119 0.807***
(0.0302) (0.0860) (0.0317) (0.0220) (0.0859) (0.0317)
dum6 -0.0672 -0.150 -0.683*** -0.0465 -0.168* -0.678***
(0.0427) (0.0922) (0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0921) (0.0264)
dum7 -0.188*** 2.034*** 0.406 -0.0892*** 1.966*** 0.440*
(0.0322) (0.619) (0.256) (0.0235) (0.617) (0.255)
L.l gerontocracy -3.745*** -4.738*** -3.751*** -4.753***
(0.593) (0.228) (0.592) (0.227)
L.l newcomers 1.202 11.92*** 1.778 11.71***
(1.718) (0.677) (1.713) (0.676)
L.l seniority 1.554 7.098*** 1.836 7.005***
(1.355) (0.547) (1.352) (0.546)
L.inter -0.117 -1.765*** -0.205 -1.733***
(0.288) (0.115) (0.287) (0.115)
L.l education -0.289* -0.682*** -0.322** -0.675***
(0.149) (0.0607) (0.149) (0.0606)
L.l background -0.130 -0.629*** -0.129 -0.619***
(0.135) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0546)
L.local 0.308*** -0.645*** 0.259*** -0.631***
(0.0766) (0.0292) (0.0764) (0.0292)
L.roots 0.150 1.573*** 0.176 1.573***
(0.127) (0.0425) (0.126) (0.0425)
gos 0.118*** 0.0442 0.110*** 0.0448
(0.0325) (0.0501) (0.0237) (0.0501)
l gict 0.379*** 0.379***
(0.0468) (0.0467)
pee pe 0.0373*** 0.0255*** 0.0371*** 0.0252***
(0.00542) (0.00219) (0.00540) (0.00219)
l nict 0.351*** 0.337***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00588 0.0298*** -0.00417 -0.00480 0.0299*** -0.00410
(0.00656) (0.0109) (0.00451) (0.00478) (0.0109) (0.00451)
trend 0.0918*** 0.134*** 0.0927*** 0.134***
(0.00678) (0.00101) (0.00677) (0.00101)
l ict 0.0385*** 0.0159***
(0.00590) (0.00429)
Constant 4.114*** -181.7*** -290.3*** 4.450*** -184.9*** -289.1***
(0.156) (15.65) (3.187) (0.113) (15.62) (3.183)
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.133 0.868 0.972 0.043 0.868 0.972
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 18: Gerontocracy & TFP, Distribution services#1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I II
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00938 0.00950 -0.00558 0.00961
(0.00759) (0.0119) (0.00550) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0455 0.0527** 0.0503
(0.0298) (0.0479) (0.0216) (0.0479)
l hls -0.0157 0.0269 -0.0121 0.0271
(0.0110) (0.0177) (0.00799) (0.0177)
l marketopeness 0.245*** -0.532*** 0.0556* 0.0831*** -0.548*** 0.0650**
(0.0356) (0.0764) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0763) (0.0286)
dum2 -0.0635*** -0.639 -0.762*** -0.0239 -0.653 -0.720***
(0.0214) (0.563) (0.211) (0.0156) (0.562) (0.210)
dum3 0.0173 -0.944** -0.689*** 0.0235 -0.927** -0.675***
(0.0225) (0.460) (0.172) (0.0163) (0.459) (0.171)
dum4 0.103*** -0.00556 1.174*** 0.0445*** 0.0183 1.166***
(0.0137) (0.129) (0.0426) (0.00998) (0.129) (0.0425)
dum5 0.0631** -0.301*** 0.578*** 0.0286 -0.260*** 0.562***
(0.0251) (0.0801) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0800) (0.0277)
dum6 -0.0706* -0.240*** -0.600*** -0.0448 -0.257*** -0.592***
(0.0424) (0.0910) (0.0229) (0.0308) (0.0909) (0.0228)
dum7 -0.189*** -0.244 -1.254*** -0.0904*** -0.277 -1.213***
(0.0320) (0.557) (0.207) (0.0233) (0.556) (0.207)
L.l gerontocracy -3.604*** -5.619*** -3.604*** -5.641***
(0.627) (0.209) (0.626) (0.208)
L.l newcomers -1.490 12.51*** -0.917 12.26***
(1.673) (0.581) (1.670) (0.579)
L.l seniority -1.729 6.246*** -1.421 6.131***
(1.242) (0.452) (1.239) (0.450)
L.inter 0.361 -1.807*** 0.272 -1.768***
(0.277) (0.0983) (0.277) (0.0980)
L.l education -0.440*** -0.707*** -0.466*** -0.699***
(0.148) (0.0541) (0.148) (0.0540)
L.l background -0.181 -0.745*** -0.180 -0.735***
(0.138) (0.0498) (0.138) (0.0496)
L.local 0.523*** -0.279*** 0.474*** -0.260***
(0.0727) (0.0268) (0.0725) (0.0267)
L.roots 0.123 1.133*** 0.151 1.127***
(0.126) (0.0417) (0.126) (0.0415)
gos 0.117*** 0.0527 0.109*** 0.0533
(0.0323) (0.0500) (0.0234) (0.0500)
l gict 0.352*** 0.352***
(0.0514) (0.0513)
pee gdp 0.0717*** 0.179*** 0.0696*** 0.180***
(0.0192) (0.00631) (0.0192) (0.00629)
l nict 0.342*** 0.328***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00658 0.0423*** 0.00368 -0.00499 0.0424*** 0.00367
(0.00673) (0.0114) (0.00428) (0.00490) (0.0114) (0.00428)
trend 0.0881*** 0.125*** 0.0891*** 0.124***
(0.00689) (0.000871) (0.00687) (0.000869)
l ict 0.0377*** 0.0151***
(0.00588) (0.00427)
Constant 4.123*** -155.3*** -263.7*** 4.435*** -158.8*** -262.2***
(0.155) (15.15) (2.430) (0.113) (15.11) (2.422)
Observations 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670
R-squared 0.133 0.866 0.976 0.043 0.866 0.976
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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Table 19: Gerontocracy & TFP, Distribution services#2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
III IV
VARIABLES l tfp l ict l gict l tfp go l ict l gict
l hhs 0.00973 0.00854 -0.00604 0.00856
(0.00765) (0.0119) (0.00556) (0.0119)
l hms 0.145*** 0.0461 0.0484** 0.0508
(0.0300) (0.0477) (0.0218) (0.0477)
l hls -0.0147 0.0236 -0.0128 0.0236
(0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00806) (0.0176)
l marketopeness 0.244*** -0.662*** -0.166*** 0.0816*** -0.676*** -0.159***
(0.0359) (0.0752) (0.0311) (0.0262) (0.0751) (0.0311)
dum2 -0.0632*** 1.626*** 1.554*** -0.0243 1.570*** 1.594***
(0.0215) (0.594) (0.243) (0.0157) (0.593) (0.243)
dum3 0.0167 1.108** 1.113*** 0.0226 1.093** 1.128***
(0.0226) (0.509) (0.209) (0.0165) (0.508) (0.209)
dum4 0.103*** 0.280** 1.584*** 0.0439*** 0.299** 1.580***
(0.0138) (0.135) (0.0464) (0.0100) (0.135) (0.0463)
dum5 0.0679** -0.160* 0.819*** 0.0330 -0.119 0.807***
(0.0302) (0.0860) (0.0317) (0.0220) (0.0859) (0.0317)
dum6 -0.0672 -0.150 -0.683*** -0.0465 -0.168* -0.678***
(0.0427) (0.0922) (0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0921) (0.0264)
dum7 -0.188*** 2.034*** 0.406 -0.0892*** 1.966*** 0.440*
(0.0322) (0.619) (0.256) (0.0235) (0.617) (0.255)
L.l gerontocracy -3.745*** -4.738*** -3.751*** -4.753***
(0.593) (0.228) (0.592) (0.227)
L.l newcomers 1.202 11.92*** 1.778 11.71***
(1.718) (0.677) (1.713) (0.676)
L.l seniority 1.554 7.098*** 1.836 7.005***
(1.355) (0.547) (1.352) (0.546)
L.inter -0.117 -1.765*** -0.205 -1.733***
(0.288) (0.115) (0.287) (0.115)
L.l education -0.289* -0.682*** -0.322** -0.675***
(0.149) (0.0607) (0.149) (0.0606)
L.l background -0.130 -0.629*** -0.129 -0.619***
(0.135) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0546)
L.local 0.308*** -0.645*** 0.259*** -0.631***
(0.0766) (0.0292) (0.0764) (0.0292)
L.roots 0.150 1.573*** 0.176 1.573***
(0.127) (0.0425) (0.126) (0.0425)
gos 0.118*** 0.0442 0.110*** 0.0448
(0.0325) (0.0501) (0.0237) (0.0501)
l gict 0.379*** 0.379***
(0.0468) (0.0467)
pee pe 0.0373*** 0.0255*** 0.0371*** 0.0252***
(0.00542) (0.00219) (0.00540) (0.00219)
l nict 0.351*** 0.337***
(0.0353) (0.0352)
hp s 0.00588 0.0298*** -0.00417 -0.00480 0.0299*** -0.00410
(0.00656) (0.0109) (0.00451) (0.00478) (0.0109) (0.00451)
trend 0.0918*** 0.134*** 0.0927*** 0.134***
(0.00678) (0.00101) (0.00677) (0.00101)
l ict 0.0385*** 0.0159***
(0.00590) (0.00429)
Constant 4.114*** -181.7*** -290.3*** 4.450*** -184.9*** -289.1***
(0.156) (15.65) (3.187) (0.113) (15.62) (3.183)
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.133 0.868 0.972 0.043 0.868 0.972
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Models I and II present TFP (value added based) as dependent variable while models III and IV present tfp (gross aoutput
based) growth as dependent variable. Models I and III have public expenditure on education expressed in terms of GDP while models
II and IV have public expenditure on education expressed as share of the total public expenditure.
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A.5 IV estimates: sector by sector
Table 20: 2SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Elecom Mexelec Finbus Pers Distr
VARIABLES l tfp l tfp l tfp l tfp l tfp l tfp
l ict 0.0429*** 0.188*** 0.0778*** -0.0418*** 0.0509*** -0.0856***
(0.00465) (0.0221) (0.00697) (0.0140) (0.0104) (0.00914)
l hhs 0.0129** -0.116*** -0.0676*** 0.0612 -0.0379** -0.0276***
(0.00502) (0.0413) (0.00963) (0.0375) (0.0154) (0.00845)
l hms 0.00457 -0.605*** -0.135*** 0.119 -0.133*** -0.0619**
(0.00938) (0.108) (0.0208) (0.0764) (0.0343) (0.0241)
l hls -0.00667 -0.381*** -0.0988*** 0.0307 -0.134*** -0.104***
(0.00715) (0.0671) (0.0187) (0.0326) (0.0276) (0.0262)
l marketopeness 0.0648** 0.556*** 0.225*** -0.0610 0.0202 -0.0361
(0.0256) (0.0898) (0.0340) (0.0657) (0.0477) (0.0414)
dum2 -0.0341** -0.202*** -0.143*** -0.0533 -0.0288 -0.0160
(0.0157) (0.0645) (0.0227) (0.0580) (0.0313) (0.0250)
dum3 -0.0264** -0.0993* -0.00836 -0.0232 0.0544* -0.00660
(0.0130) (0.0516) (0.0181) (0.0401) (0.0280) (0.0257)
dum4 0.0443*** 0.108*** 0.0754*** -0.0220 0.0294 0.0649***
(0.0101) (0.0367) (0.0136) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0166)
dum5 0.0333 0.0805 0.0751*** -0.106* 0.0521 0.00243
(0.0206) (0.0704) (0.0267) (0.0625) (0.0357) (0.0331)
dum6 -0.00619 -1.178*** -0.330*** 0.137 -0.537*** -0.358***
(0.0305) (0.243) (0.0682) (0.152) (0.104) (0.0854)
dum7 -0.0478** -0.573*** -0.147*** 0.00332 0.0128 0.0268
(0.0239) (0.0880) (0.0324) (0.0661) (0.0470) (0.0445)
gos 0.0585*** 0.551*** 0.789*** 0.351*** 0.272*** 0.258***
(0.0217) (0.100) (0.105) (0.123) (0.0885) (0.0987)
hp s 0.00541 0.00602 0.00423 0.00565 0.0114 0.0146*
(0.00550) (0.0188) (0.00703) (0.0144) (0.00933) (0.00874)
Constant 4.440*** 8.306*** 5.419*** 3.957*** 5.362*** 5.553***
(0.0811) (0.710) (0.174) (0.487) (0.275) (0.223)
Observations 3,743 260 1,300 251 511 260
R-squared 0.062 0.667 0.261 0.186 0.231 0.547
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 21: GMM estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Elecom Mexelec Finbus Pers Distr
VARIABLES l tfp l tfp l tfp l tfp l tfp l tfp
l ict 0.0418*** 0.166*** 0.0755*** -0.0348*** 0.0540*** -0.0888***
(0.00502) (0.0219) (0.00837) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.00924)
l hhs 0.0118*** -0.0712** -0.0640*** 0.0157 -0.0287 -0.0322***
(0.00425) (0.0324) (0.00982) (0.0368) (0.0198) (0.00787)
l hms -0.000394 -0.565*** -0.128*** 0.0995 -0.0959** -0.0460*
(0.00759) (0.0881) (0.0176) (0.0612) (0.0480) (0.0252)
l hls -0.00325 -0.372*** -0.0825*** 0.0195 -0.123*** -0.115***
(0.00506) (0.0635) (0.0155) (0.0235) (0.0322) (0.0249)
l marketopeness 0.0957*** 0.567*** 0.238*** -0.143** 0.0455 0.0202
(0.0250) (0.0850) (0.0303) (0.0677) (0.0516) (0.0404)
dum2 -0.0488*** -0.170*** -0.158*** -0.0435 -0.0297 -0.0332
(0.0134) (0.0567) (0.0224) (0.0465) (0.0346) (0.0210)
dum3 -0.0365*** -0.141*** -0.0211 0.0733* 0.0419 0.000749
(0.0111) (0.0490) (0.0151) (0.0376) (0.0281) (0.0219)
dum4 0.0638*** 0.133*** 0.111*** -0.0233 0.0302* 0.0644***
(0.0112) (0.0309) (0.0166) (0.0200) (0.0170) (0.0108)
dum5 0.0342*** 0.0608 0.0814*** -0.117** 0.0470*** 0.00460
(0.00813) (0.0509) (0.0109) (0.0500) (0.0152) (0.0122)
dum6 0.0115 -1.261*** -0.266*** 0.0820 -0.497*** -0.389***
(0.0206) (0.224) (0.0549) (0.106) (0.110) (0.0758)
dum7 -0.0683*** -0.619*** -0.155*** 0.0736 -0.0213 -0.0345
(0.0221) (0.0866) (0.0289) (0.0589) (0.0475) (0.0434)
gos 0.0932*** 0.551*** 0.889*** 0.400*** 0.347*** 0.193**
(0.0196) (0.0923) (0.124) (0.108) (0.105) (0.0828)
hp s 0.00530 0.0133 0.00181 0.00554 0.00990 0.0130**
(0.00566) (0.0148) (0.00711) (0.00996) (0.00742) (0.00597)
Constant 4.492*** 8.151*** 5.345*** 4.044*** 5.168*** 5.639***
(0.0755) (0.633) (0.153) (0.424) (0.370) (0.237)
Observations 3,743 260 1,300 251 511 260
R-squared 0.060 0.656 0.252 0.146 0.219 0.520
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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